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Abstract 
 
Humans complete complex commonplace tasks, such as understanding 
sentences, with striking speed and accuracy. This expertise is dependent on 
anticipation: Predicting upcoming words gets us ahead of the game. But how do 
we master the game in the first place? To make accurate predictions, children 
must first learn their language. One possibility is that prediction serves double 
duty, enabling rapid language learning as well as understanding. Children could 
master the structures of their language by predicting how speakers will behave 
and, when those guesses are wrong, revising their linguistic representations. A 
number of prominent computational models assume that children learn in this 
way. But is that assumption correct? Here, we lay out the requirements for 
showing that children use “predictive learning”, and review the current evidence 
for this position. We argue that, despite widespread enthusiasm for the idea, we 
cannot yet conclude that children “predict to learn”. 
147 words 
 
Keywords: Language acquisition, language processing, prediction, error-driven 
learning, dialogue  
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Learning to predict or predicting to learn? 
 
Human interactions require a well-timed interplay of behaviours that we seem to 
accomplish effortlessly, despite the complex and dynamic nature of our 
environment. When dancers move in pairs, when musicians improvise in a group, 
and when speakers converse in a pub, each individual has to rapidly make sense 
of the environment around them and then respond in an appropriate manner. For 
conversation, these difficulties are particularly acute. In order to keep an 
interaction going, listeners must make sense of what they hear in terms of its 
underlying syntax, its semantics and its contribution to the discourse. Then, they 
have to make a considered response, running the process in reverse, from high-
level discourse goals all the way down to motor commands.  
 
Adult humans manage to accomplish these complex processes with ease, which 
raises two questions. First, what are the mental mechanisms that allow adults to 
accurately and effortlessly converse? Second, how do these mechanisms 
develop? That is to say, how do children, who start off innocent of their 
conversational environment, become savvy, swift interlocutors? A large number 
of theories have recently converged on the idea that both of these questions 
have the same answer: Prediction (Bar, 2007; Clark, 2013; Elman, 1990). 
 
Prediction has become key to a number of successful cognitive models of 
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language comprehension and production (Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006; Hale, 
2001; Levy, 2007; Pickering & Garrod, 2013). Accurate expectations about the 
world allow us to quickly make sense of incoming stimuli and respond in 
appropriate ways: If we can guess what others will say before they say it, then 
we can reduce the computational burden of quickly interpreting their utterance, 
and produce preliminary plans for what we should say ourselves (Kutas, DeLong, 
& Smith, 2011; Pickering & Garrod, 2013). This sort of moment-by-moment 
prediction seems to be pervasive in the mechanisms that we use to understand 
and produce language (Kutas et al., 2011; Pickering & Garrod, 2013). 
 
In contrast, research on how children acquire the ability to use language has 
traditionally either ignored or eschewed prediction, on the assumption that 
learning to predict requires knowing the language in the first place (Pinker, 1984, 
1989; Tomasello, 1992, 2003). This is part of a deeper disconnect, in which 
theories of language learning rarely take account of the moment-by-moment 
processes by which children actually understand language (Bowerman, 1987). 
Instead, linguistic development is typically conceived of either as a process of 
offline hypothesis testing (Pinker, 1995; Wexler & Culicover, 1980) or as fitting a 
grammar to a large stock of memorized data (Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier, 
2011). 
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Is this separation between mechanisms for processing and mechanisms for 
learning justified? An increasing number of theories and models have argued that 
it is not (Chang et al., 2006; Elman, 1990; Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999). 
Instead, children are supposed to be predictive learners, generating expectations 
based on the limited grammar that they have learned so far, and then adjusting 
that grammar when their predictions fail. This possibility cuts to a fundamental 
question in cognitive science: How much continuity is there between the cognitive 
architectures found in adults and children? That is, are there common 
mechanisms for learning about and processing the world around us? In particular, 
is prediction an ability that emerges only in expert systems, or is it a mechanism 
that enables the system to become expert in the first place?  
 
This paper attempts to evaluate the current evidence for these two possibilities. 
Predictive theories make certain assumptions about children’s ability to make 
sense of language on a moment-by-moment basis, and we will compare these 
assumptions to what we currently know about online language processing in 
young children. To foreshadow, we will argue that the evidence is not there yet: 
what we know about the way children process language may point in the 
direction suggested by these theories, but there is still room for reasonable doubt. 
In the final part of this paper we will discuss how these models might be 
extended from explaining how children learn simple sentences, to accounting for 
PREDICTING	  TO	  LEARN?	  
	   6	  
children’s developing ability to take part in complex, coordinated language use – 
in other words, conversation. 
 
Prediction-based learning 
 
The idea that prediction might help with language learning is not new, but it has 
been controversial. For instance, learning via prediction has often been 
suggested as a solution to the famed “no negative evidence problem”, in which 
children can “unlearn” ungrammatical forms (e.g., mouses, don’t giggle me) 
despite not receiving explicit corrections (so-called negative evidence). As one 
example, Chomsky (1981, p.9)  suggested that prediction-driven learning could 
serve as a form of “implicit” negative evidence: “if certain structures or rules fail to 
be exemplified in relatively simple expressions, where they would expect to be 
found, than a (possibly marked) option is selected excluding them in the 
grammar.” That is to say, children can make guesses about exactly how 
meanings should be expressed in their language, and then update their grammar 
based on whether or not their prediction is correct. 
 
Still, many of the most prominent models of language learning have either 
ignored or explicitly disavowed this type of implicit feedback. For example, 
Pinker’s (1984) theory of language acquisition, which remains one of the most 
complete and well-specified models that we have, explicitly states that predictive 
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learning is not necessary for overcoming the learnability problems associated 
with the lack of negative evidence. Instead, he suggests that children gradually 
learn to exclude ungrammatical wordforms or sentences based on a Unique 
Entry Principle, according to which no two forms (e.g., mouses and mice) will 
have exactly the same meaning and occupy exactly the same slot in an 
inflectional or derivational paradigm.  Therefore, a child who has encountered 
mice a sufficient number of times will eventually learn that the form mouses 
should not be part of the grammar, as mice already provides a plural form for 
mouse. Constraint-satisfaction models (MacWhinney, 1987, 2004) assume that 
children can recover from overgeneralization because the two alternative forms 
compete with one another; the adult form is strengthened and eventually “wins 
over” the regular form simply because it recurs more often in the input. In both 
types of model children do not need to predict the wrong form to learn the correct 
one, but it is sufficient for them to comprehend the correct form and realize it has 
the same meaning as the incorrect one. 
 
A number of other prominent models, such as Tomasello’s Verb Island 
hypothesis (Tomasello, 1992, 2003), also tend to elide the notion of prediction 
from discussion. Under Tomasello’s hypothesis (building on classic ideas by  
Braine, 1963) the process of language acquisition is a process of abstraction. 
Children gather large amounts of linguistic data, and then generate a grammar 
through comparison and analogy across sentences. What models such as 
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Pinker’s and Tomasello’s have in common is the assumption that learning occurs 
off-line (Bowerman, 1987). These models largely ignore what happens while the 
child attempts to understand or produce a sentence (i.e., during on-line 
processing). Instead, they are interested in the end result of these processes 
(e.g., does the child understand the sentence or not? Is the child able to identify 
lexical items as nouns and verbs?). This is because it is the end result that 
matters for learning. In a sense, these models conceive of language acquisition 
as a process occurring at a rather slow pace, with the child’s internal grammar 
changing only when a considerable amount of evidence accumulates against the 
child’s hypotheses about the structure of the language.  
 
Models of predictive learning are very different. In these models the learning 
mechanism is not based on feature checking or abstraction, but on prediction 
error. In particular, children can use their current linguistic knowledge to generate 
predictions about what they will hear next. When these predictions are checked 
against reality, the resulting discrepancy (the error signal) can be used to update 
the child’s linguistic knowledge, and to enhance future predictions. This is similar 
in spirit to Chomsky’s ideas about implicit negative evidence, but on a much 
grander scale. Perhaps more importantly, these models make explicit 
connections between processing and learning. Every time the child processes a 
sentence, prediction error can be used to tune the child’s ability to make 
successful predictions later on, and therefore every instance of processing is also 
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a learning instance. Learning therefore takes place on-line (Bowerman, 1987), 
rather than after the fact.  
 
The actual mechanics of predictive learning vary across different models. The 
locus classicus for these theories is Elman’s (Elman, 1990, 1993) application of a 
simple recurrent network to the problem of learning simple languages. Briefly, 
Elman developed and trained a set of simple neural networks that were 
constructed from a layer of input units, a layer of output units, a hidden layer 
between the input and output units, and (unusually) a context layer, which 
received input from the hidden layer and returned its output back to the hidden 
layer at the next time-point. As such, the context units acted as a form of memory. 
This allowed the network to learn the structure of sequential input. For instance, 
Elman provided it with words strung together in simple English-like sentences 
(man eat cookie, woman smell rock). The network was trained to predict which 
word would be said next; during training, this predicted word (the model’s output) 
was compared to the actual next word in the sequence and the resulting error 
signal was used to adjust connections between the network’s units through 
backpropagation (i.e., the network used prediction-driven learning). Learning to 
predict words incrementally allowed the network to perform a distributional 
analysis (i.e., learning co-occurrences between different words), which allowed it 
to learn representations in its hidden units that, to some degree, are similar to 
distributionally-defined categories such as noun or intransitive verb (although 
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they are not as abstract, Chang, 2002; Marcus, 2001). In doing so, it became 
able to accurately predict the types of words that would likely follow one another 
(e.g., transitive verbs are followed by nouns). 
 
Later work has extended Elman’s results in a number of ways, for example by 
defining more complex networks that are built from more complex primitive 
elements. Most prominently, Chang, Dell and Bock’s (2006) connectionist model 
assumes that, during language comprehension, children predict which word they 
will hear next using not only a representation of the previously heard word, but 
also two additional pathways containing two types of representation. One 
pathway contains semantic representations that specify relationships between 
events (e.g., eating) and lexical concepts (e.g., cake), including the assignment 
of lexical concepts to thematic roles (e.g., cake à theme). This allows the 
network to guess the intended message of the speaker, and use that to generate 
predictions. Another pathway contains a representation of how linguistic items 
should be sequenced  (i.e., how words are ordered in a syntactically correct 
manner) using an embedded recurrent network. These two routes are combined 
to generate predictions about the most likely candidates for the next word.  
 
The model’s prediction is then compared to the actual word that occurs in the 
input. The discrepancy (prediction error) is used to adjust the weights in the 
model’s sequencing units as well as in the connections between the sequencing 
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units and the semantic units, and between words and lexical concepts. The 
particular structure of this network – its combination of single recurrent network 
for sequencing and a more symbolic architecture to represent meaning – allows it 
to learn much more abstract mappings between meaning and linguistic form than 
Elman’s original network. This means that, like children, it can represent fully 
abstract syntactic categories and, like adults, can generate predictions about 
upcoming words in novel situations. In sum, when prediction-driven learning is 
combined with an adequately structured cognitive architecture, it can generate 
behaviors that are plausibly similar to how children learn language, and how 
adults process it. 
 
Not all prediction-error based models are connectionist. Ramscar, Dye, and 
McCauley (2013) proposed a much simpler model, based on ideas from learning 
theory, that attempts to explain how children master morphology (rather than 
syntax). In particular, the model attempts to learn which of a scene’s semantic 
features are the best predictors of its appropriate phonological label (e.g., should 
scenes with multiple entities be given plural labels? Should that label be a regular 
or irregular plural?). The model assumes that children extract a range of 
semantic information from a scene (e.g., type of objects, number of objects) and 
gradually learn which of these features is informative with regard to its label. 
They do this using prediction. More specifically, children generate expectations 
about which labels they should hear for which scenes and, when they are wrong, 
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adjust the associations between meaning and form in accordance with the 
Rescorla-Wagner learning rule. 
 
The Rescorla-Wagner rule provides a description of how learners should adjust 
associations between two stimuli. Historically, it was developed to provide 
descriptions of conditioning behaviour in animals (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), but 
its application has been much broader (e.g., to areas of human psychology such 
as causal reasoning or category learning Gluck & Bower, 1988; Medin, Shanks, 
& Holyoak, 1996). It is particularly interesting because it provides a precise 
specification of how the model should learn from both positive evidence for an 
association between two stimuli, and from evidence that an association between 
two stimuli is absent (i.e., implicit negative evidence). For linguistic stimuli, this 
means that the non-occurrence of an expected event can be as informative as 
the occurrence of an unexpected event: Both cause the learner to update their 
associations between meaning and form and thereby learn to discriminate which 
aspects of meaning are informative with regard to the occurrence of a given form. 
This means that the model can explain notoriously challenging developmental 
phenomena such as the “no negative evidence” problems. For example, the 
aspect “plural number of objects” in combination with the aspect “mousiness” will 
initially lead children to predict both the regular form mouses and the irregular 
mice as labels for a scene with more than one mouse in it. However, only mice 
will occur when both meaning aspects are present (and it will not occur when 
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either of them is not present); therefore the child will learn to associate mice to 
the perception of more than one mouse, and commensurately reduce the 
association with mouses. 
 
These models are not perfect. Elman’s fails to learn fully abstract syntax; Chang 
Dell and Bock’s fails to explain certain standard results in adult psycholinguistics 
(such as the lexical boost, Pickering & Branigan, 1998, although see Chang, 
Baumann, Pappert, & Fitz, 2014); Ramscar, Dye and McCauley’s has no notion 
of combinatorial linguistic structure. But they all capture the idea that on-line, 
prediction-driven learning can help children to extract structure that is not clearly 
flagged in the input. That is to say, the models show how children can solve 
some of the major problems of language acquisition: Prediction lets them learn 
the distributional structure of the mapping from semantics to word sequences (i.e., 
the model can discover syntax) or structure in the mapping from lexical 
semantics to phonology (i.e., the model can discover morphology). What is the 
evidence that these predictive mechanisms allow children to master language? 
 
Requirements for prediction-based learning 
Based on these models, and on an analysis of the problems children face in 
language learning, we can ask what sort of predictions children will need to make 
in order to generate the necessary error signals for predictive learning. One 
critical component is that children’s predictions must be incremental: Children 
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must be generating expectations about upcoming words based on what they 
have heard so far. This characteristic is important for performing a distributional 
syntactic analysis of the input (as demonstrated in the models of Elman 1990, 
1993, and Chang et al., 2006). This means that children must be able to 
construct partial interpretations of sentences, predict based on these, and then 
update based on the input. For example, if a child hears the sentence The boy 
will eat the cake, it is not sufficient that she only recognize boy as the subject and 
cake as the object after having heard the whole sentence. Rather, she must build 
a partial interpretation in which boy is recognized as the subject before the 
sentence ends, allowing her to predict that the object might be cake. 
 
Children must also be predicting using information that will generate an error 
signal at the appropriate level of analysis. For instance, in order to learn the 
syntax of their language, children should predict based on the syntactic 
knowledge that they have acquired so far, and not simply rely on predictions 
based on simpler representations, such as semantic associations. The difference 
between these two strategies can be illustrated by the verb eat, which is related 
to both cake and chew, but does not predict chew in The boy ate the… This 
difference can be seen in Chang et al.’s (2006) model, in which expectations 
about upcoming words are not only driven by semantic units, but also by 
representations of previously learned linguistic sequences. 
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Useful predictions must also be highly detailed, containing not just meanings or 
syntactic categories, but also sounds. For instance, there are certain facts about 
English that predictive learners can only capture if their predictions incorporate 
the sounds of words. These include phonological regularities (e.g., which nouns 
require a/an) and also grammatical irregularities. In particular, predictions have to 
include the sounds of upcoming words if they are going to help with the “no 
negative evidence” problem, as seen in Ramscar’s model. To illustrate, if children 
consistently predict that the upcoming phonology of a word will be mouses rather 
than mice, then the resulting error signal when they encounter mice should lead 
them to the correct form. But if, instead, their predictions solely concern the 
syntax and semantics of upcoming words (i.e., children expect a plural noun with 
the meaning “multiples of mouse”), then their input (mice) will be completely 
consistent with their predictions (as mice and mouses are synonyms), and should 
not result in learning. 
 
Finally, in an optimal system, predictions should be probabilistic and parallel: A 
system that is able to simultaneously suggest, weigh and check multiple 
possibilities is considerably more adaptive (fast-learning) than a system that can 
only check one hypothesis at a time, which will be slow and ponderous (this is an 
aspect of all the models discussed above). As an example, on hearing The girl 
ate the… a child would assign different probabilities to multiple outcomes: cake, 
bread, potato, water, etc., and then—once the predicted word has occurred—
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could update all these probabilities in order to make their language more adult-
like. All of the above models have this feature at least at some level of analysis 
(e.g., in Chang et al.’s model more than one meaning representation can be 
active in parallel but a single word is predicted at any given time). 
 
Do children’s predictions meet these requirements? Interestingly, we know from 
prior work that adults’ predictions have all of the required properties: Adults make 
predictions incrementally, they predict on the basis of several types of cues, and 
they predict at different linguistic levels (from semantics to phonology). Evidence 
for incrementality comes from Kamide, Altmann, and Haywood’s (2003) 
demonstration that adults update their predictions based on what has been said 
so far. They recorded adult listeners’ eye movements to a visual scene while 
listening to sentences such as The girl will ride the carousel or The man will ride 
the motorbike. Upon hearing ride, listeners were more likely to look towards the 
agent-related theme, suggesting that they combined semantic information about 
the agent (e.g., that girls are too small for motorbikes) with semantic information 
provided by the verb, and anticipated what would be mentioned next (although 
see the discussion of Borovsky, Elman, & Fernald, 2012 below). Similarly, adult 
listeners combine intonation with semantic information to constrain predictions of 
upcoming referents, at least when the input is syntactically ambiguous (Weber, 
Grice, & Crocker, 2006). 
 
PREDICTING	  TO	  LEARN?	  
	   17	  
To make these incremental predictions, adults attend to multiple levels of 
linguistic representation. They generate predictions based on semantic 
associations (e.g., expecting to hear dog soon after hearing cat, Lau, Holcomb, & 
Kuperberg, 2013), they generate predictions based on syntactic structure (e.g., 
expecting to read a noun after reading a determiner, Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008), 
and they generate predictions based on a combination of the syntax so far and 
their background semantic knowledge. This final point was demonstrated in a 
study by Kukona, Fang, Aicher, Chen, and Magnuson (2011): Adults listened to 
phrases such as Toby will arrest the…, while viewing an array of characters (e.g., 
a robber, a policeman, and a fireman). On hearing arrest, adults gazed to 
characters associated with the action (e.g., robber, policeman), suggesting that 
they predicted on the basis of semantic associations. However, they were more 
likely to gaze toward characters that were not only associated, but also were 
about to be mentioned (i.e., the robber), especially when given more time. This 
suggests that expectations are not only generated based on semantic 
associations, but also based on verbal argument structure. 
 
Moreover, when adults make predictions, they make them at a fine level of detail, 
from semantics to syntax and all the way down to the phonological form of 
upcoming words. For instance, Dikker, Rabagliati, and Pylkkanen (2009) used 
magnetoencephalography to demonstrate that adults show enhanced “mismatch” 
responses in sensory cortices when they read words whose written form does 
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not match their expectations (see also Kim & Lai, 2012). DeLong, Urbach, and 
Kutas (2005) used electroencephalography to show that adults generate 
expectations that include the form of upcoming articles, in particular showing a 
mismatch response to an when reading the phrase the day was windy so the boy 
went out to fly an…. The context in this phrase leads them to expect the word kite, 
which should be preceded by a not an. Since the two articles have the same 
semantic content, the mismatch response appears to require a phonological 
prediction.  
 
Finally, adults also appear to make predictions in parallel. For instance, when 
participants read unexpected words, their time gazing on that word is directly 
related to its predictability (Smith & Levy, 2013): Highly-expected words are read 
faster than less-expected words, which are read faster than even-less-expected 
words, and so on. The same appears to be true of the N400, a component of the 
event-related-potential response to reading a word: The size of the N400 indexes 
the degree to which a word is expected or unexpected in its context (e.g., 
DeLong et al., 2005; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000) and it also reflects the number 
of words that are similar in form or lexical meaning to the target word (i.e., how 
difficult it is to select the target word amongst other possible candidates Laszlo & 
Federmeier, 2011). 
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The predictions that adults make, therefore, would seem to be ideal for learning 
from (and indeed there is evidence that adults’ grammatical preferences change 
through error-based learning, Jaeger & Snider, 2013). This raises the possibility 
that language-learning children may be generating similar predictions, allowing 
them to use online processing mechanisms to acquire language. 
 
 
Prediction and processing in young children. 
 
While it is clear that children do eventually learn to make predictions of all types 
(after all, children eventually become adults), it is not clear whether children can 
make predictions that are useful for learning before they have fully mastered their 
language, and it is even less clear whether children can use these predictions for 
the purpose of mastering their language. Here, we survey the evidence that 
language-learning children make predictions that are incremental, that are based 
on linguistic structure, that include phonological information, and that are made in 
parallel. 
 
A prerequisite of any prediction-based theory is that children must process 
language in an online fashion. In particular, if children are to make incremental 
predictions, then they must interpret language incrementally: They should 
interpret words as they hear them, and not wait until a sentence ends in order to 
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determine what it means. Consistent with this, young children’s language 
processing does appear, in many respects, to be almost adult-like. For instance, 
children in their second year can interpret words quickly and incrementally:  Eye 
tracking work suggests that 18 month-olds can reliably identify the referents of 
familiar words within 300ms of their onset (Fernald, Pinto, Swingley, Weinberg, & 
McRoberts, 1998; Swingley, Pinto, & Fernald, 1999). Similarly, preschool children 
are able to process complex syntactic structures on-line (Thothathiri & Snedeker, 
2008; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999) and can use multiple sources of 
information (e.g., prosody, lexical co-occurrence statistics) to determine the most 
likely meaning of a syntactically ambiguous sentence (Snedeker & Trueswell, 
2004; Snedeker & Yuan, 2008). 
 
Beyond this, there are now a number of demonstrations that children can make 
guesses about what will be referred to next in a sentence. The importance of this 
for learning, however, is unclear. Early work by Nation, Marshall, and Altmann 
(2003) used a visual world paradigm to demonstrate that older children can 
generate semantic predictions: 10- and 11-year-olds viewed scenes while 
listening to sentences where the final word could be predicted (Jane watched her 
mother eat a cake) or not (Jane watched her mother choose a cake). Children’s 
eye movements suggested that, immediately after encountering the verb, they 
could predict which object in the scene would be mentioned next: They tended to 
fixate that object before it was mentioned. Of course, these children were 10 
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years old, and had typically mastered the grammar of their language. Evidence 
that (much) younger children also make predictions comes from Mani and Huettig 
(2012). They used the same basic paradigm (but with much simpler scenes) to 
show that even 24-month-olds can use verb meanings to generate expectations 
about upcoming meanings (contrasting The boy eats the big cake and The boy 
sees the big cake). This effect was only seen in children with larger expressive 
vocabularies (see also Borovsky, Elman and Fernald, 2012), which suggests that, 
in some way, children’s predictions are tied to linguistic ability, which we discuss 
further in the next section. But these experiments do not show that children are 
making predictions that can be, or are, used for learning: It is unclear if the 
predictions are incremental, if they are based on linguistic structure, if they 
include phonological information, and if they are made in parallel.  
 
Potential evidence for incremental predictions comes from Borovsky, Elman, and 
Fernald (2012). They demonstrated that children were able to combine semantic 
information from the subject and verb of a sentence to anticipate an upcoming 
referent. For example, children were shown an array containing a ship, a cat, a 
bone, and some treasure, while listening to phrases such as the pirate chased 
the… or the dog chased the…. On hearing the former phrase, they gazed toward 
the ship before it was even mentioned, whereas on hearing the latter phrase they 
anticipatorily gazed toward the cat. Further work has shown that children can 
generate these predictions even for newly learned-about events (e.g., after 
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learning that monkeys tend to ride buses, and tigers tend to ride trains, they will 
look at a bus on hearing the monkey rides…, Borovsky, Sweeney, Elman & 
Fernald, 2014) This suggests that children’s predictions are generated based on 
the incremental comprehension of multiple words (e.g., pirate and chase activate 
ship; dog and chase activate cat). 
 
However, this work leaves unclear the exact process by which the predictions are 
generated. In particular, the method cannot distinguish between predictions 
generated by the composition of multiple words (e.g., where children generate 
predictions by entering pirate as an argument for chase) and predictions 
generated by independent lexical access to the meaning of each of these words 
(e.g., pirate primes ship, chase primes ship, and so when both are accessed ship 
is highly primed). To our knowledge, there is no current data that distinguishes 
these possibilities. That is to say, children’s predictions do appear to be 
incremental (in that they are made as words are heard), but it is not clear that 
they are based on incremental composition of linguistic units, which is the type of 
incrementality that would be necessary for learning.  
 
Better evidence that children are generating predictions based on the incremental 
composition of linguistic units comes from work on syntactic priming. Thothathiri 
and Snedeker (2008) show that priming a verb’s argument structure affects 
children’s predictions for upcoming syntax. They had 3- and 4-year-olds children 
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listen to instructions containing verbs that can occur in either prepositional object 
constructions such as Give the birdhouse to the sheep or double object 
constructions such as Give the bird the bone. Children then acted out these 
instructions with displays that contained appropriate objects, in this case a 
birdhouse, a bird, a sheep, and a bone. Importantly, these instructions are 
identical (and thus ambiguous) up to the end of the word bird. However, 
Thothathiri and Snedeker found that children’s interpretations of these 
ambiguous phrases were biased by previously occurring phrases: On hearing 
bird, they were more likely to look at the birdhouse when they had just heard 
another sentence with a prepositional object structure (e.g., bring the ball to the 
lion) rather than a double object structure (bring the lion the ball). This suggests 
that children had some sort of expectation about the syntactic structure of the 
sentence that they were about to hear. However, this work can also be 
interpreted as an effect of integration, where children do not pre-specify the 
appropriate argument structure, but rather begin building it on hearing 
appropriate auditory input. 
 
This problem – the difficulty of disentangling effects of prediction and effects of 
integration – affects any study in which the dependent measure is a response to 
a predicted or unpredicted word (for a discussion with specific reference to the 
N400 ERP component, see Hagoort, Baggio, & Willems, 2009; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011), rather than a direct estimate of the prediction itself (for 
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examples of this, see for instance DeLong et al., 2005; Stokes, Thompson, Nobre, 
& Duncan, 2009). The difficulty of distinguishing between predictive and 
integrative accounts can be seen in an ERP study by Bernal, Dehaene-Lambertz, 
Millotte and Christophe (2010). They examined 2-year-olds’ EEG responses to 
syntactically grammatical (i.e., expected) or ungrammatical (unexpected) words, 
and found a consistent response to words that were ungrammatical in their 
syntactic context. They suggest that this response might reflect a violation of a 
syntactic prediction (e.g., children expected a noun, but heard a verb), but are 
also clear that it could be due to the difficulty of integrating an ungrammatical 
word into a syntactic structure (e.g., children search for, but cannot find, a phrase 
structure rule that will allow them to add a noun phrase to their syntactic 
structure). Difficulties disentangling prediction from integration can also be seen 
in work on children’s N400 responses (e.g., Friedrich & Friederici, 2004; Friedrich 
& Friederici, 2006), and eye tracking work looking at the effects of context on 
word recognition (Lew-Williams & Fernald, 2007). 
 
As should be clear, we currently lack direct evidence that children make the types 
of predictions that would aid learning. What about indirect evidence? This turns 
out to be mixed. Some indirect evidence is consistent with the idea that children 
might have the wherewithal to make phonological predictions. For instance, work 
on “implicit naming” suggests that children may be able to actively hold the 
phonological form of unspoken words in mind before their second birthday (this 
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ability is presumably a prerequisite for making a phonological prediction). Mani 
and Plunkett (2010) found that, after showing 18-month-olds a picture (e.g., of a 
dog), the infants were faster to recognise phonologically related words (e.g., door 
vs. boat), even though that initial picture was never explicitly named. This 
suggests that viewing the initial picture primed the phonological form of its name, 
which then primed the recognition of related target words.  
 
Recent work by Khan (2013) provides further evidence for implicit phonological 
priming. She found that, after passively viewing a picture, 24-month-olds tended 
to gaze toward “phonosemantically” related targets. For instance, after viewing a 
cup, infants gazed toward a picture of a dog over a picture of a box. This may 
seem surprising, but it makes sense when you realise that cup is phonologically 
related to cat, which semantically primes dog (this phonosemantic priming effect 
has also been found in five-year-olds, Huang and Snedeker, 2011). These results 
are not only important because they suggest that children can generate 
phonological and semantic representations of unspoken words (providing a 
potential basis for predictions at both levels of representation), but also because 
they indicate that even 2-year-olds possess an extremely interactive cognitive 
architecture, which permits extensive pre-activation of representations associated 
with the current input. 
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However, other indirect evidence raises questions about the true interactivity of 
children’s early cognitive architectures. A body of recent work on children’s 
sentence processing has shown that children as old as 5 years have difficulty 
using high-level linguistic information, such as discourse structure, to constrain 
processes such as syntactic ambiguity resolution or semantic interpretation 
(Arnold, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2007; Snedeker & Trueswell, 2004; 
Trueswell et al., 1999). As one example, eye-tracking work has shown that it 
takes 5-year-olds about one-and-a-half seconds to resolve an ambiguous 
pronoun based on discourse cues (e.g., referring to the first-mentioned referent in 
a context such as Sally ran in front of Mary. She…) while adults resolve this type 
of pronoun quickly and proactively (Arnold et al., 2007; Hartshorne et al., 2014). 
Results like this raise questions about whether children have the processing 
capacity to quickly generate predictions from which they can learn. 
 
The degree to which children consistently generate predictions from which they 
can learn is therefore unclear. We know that children do appear to have 
mechanisms for generating expectations, but we still need to know what 
information children use to generate those expectations, how detailed those 
expectations are, and whether expectations are generated rapidly enough to 
allow prediction-based learning. 
  
Predicting to learn or learning to predict? 
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While the evidence so far is suggestive that children may indeed “predict to learn”, 
it is also consistent with an alternative possibility: Once children begin to master 
language, then they also start to master the mechanisms necessary to produce 
linguistic predictions. That is to say, children “learn to predict”. In this case, 
prediction would be a consequence of language learning, and not a cause.  
 
Unfortunately, distinguishing between these two accounts – predicting to learn 
and learning to predict – is not simple. To do so, we would not only need to 
conduct experiments that test if children make the types of prediction that are 
necessary for learning, but we would also need to determine whether prediction 
is a cause or effect of language learning. This would require detailed longitudinal 
assessments of children’s ability to predict and process upcoming language, and 
an understanding of how this relates to their linguistic knowledge more broadly. 
The relationship, of course, is unlikely to be simple, as accurate predictions 
necessarily require a detailed knowledge of the language. For instance, it is hard 
to distinguish between a child who does not make predictions at all, and a child 
who makes very inaccurate predictions due to their incomplete linguistic 
knowledge. In order to discover the degree to which children predict to learn, and 
the degree to which children learn to predict, we would need to determine 
whether learners make inaccurate predictions early in development. Then, we 
would need to test if these initially inaccurate predictions help children to 
(eventually) learn an accurate grammar. For instance, we could determine 
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whether children who are better predictors (e.g., children who consistently make 
predictions about upcoming words, even if they are inaccurate) end up learning 
faster than language-matched peers. A somewhat-analogous approach has 
already been successfully pursued in work by Fernald, Marchman and 
colleagues (Fernald & Marchman, 2012; Fernald, Perfors, & Marchman, 2006; 
Marchman & Fernald, 2008), whose studies have assessed how variations in 
children’s linguistic processing speed (at a word recognition task) affects their 
later language development.1 
 
The successful completion of this enterprise will be greatly helped by the explicit 
computational models that have been developed in this area (e.g., Chang et al., 
2006; Ramscar et al., 2013). These can generate accurate hypotheses about 
what children predict, and also about how children should behave when they 
receive evidence that mismatches their predictions. The theoretical clarity and 
computational precision of the models described in Section 2 is impressive, and 
they will clearly play an important part in solving the puzzles posed by children’s 
predictions. However, we would like to emphasize that these are not the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Note	  that	  Fernald’s	  work	  raises	  a	  potential	  alternative	  route	  by	  which	  prediction	  could	  influence	  language	  development.	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  contrasted	  views	  in	  which	  prediction	  is	  specifically	  used	  as	  a	  learning	  mechanism,	  with	  views	  in	  which	  prediction	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  more	  expert	  systems	  and	  is	  not	  used	  for	  learning.	  But	  Fernald’s	  work	  suggests	  that,	  under	  the	  expert	  system	  account,	  prediction	  could	  still	  facilitate	  language	  acquisition,	  by	  increasing	  processing	  speed	  and	  thereby	  acting	  as	  a	  crutch	  for	  acquiring	  knowledge	  of	  words	  and	  grammar.	  Prediction	  can	  therefore	  facilitate	  learning	  even	  if	  children	  do	  not	  use	  predictive,	  error-­‐driven	  learning.	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possible accounts by which prediction-based learning could help children acquire 
language, and that evidence for prediction-based learning should not necessarily 
be taken as evidence that children learn language in a manner that is either 
connectionist (Chang et al., 2006; Elman, 1990) or neo-behaviourist (Ramscar et 
al., 2013).  
 
For example, prediction-based learning could also play an important role for 
models in which children learn explicit, structured representations. Informally, this 
can be seen in Chomsky’s (1981) suggestion that children could use prediction 
error to overcome the no negative evidence problem. More formally, predictive 
learning could play an important role in mechanistically implementing models of 
language learning that are typically couched at a “Computational” (i.e., 
amechanistic) level of analysis, such as Perfors et al.’s (2011) Bayesian model of 
syntactic development.  
 
Support for this idea, that predictive-learning can aide acquisition of structured 
representations, comes from outside the domain of language learning. In 
particular, recent research into reinforcement learning has provided evidence for 
so-called “model-based” reinforcement learning approaches, in which learners 
acquire explicit and structured representations of the environment that they are 
learning about (such as an explicit map of a spatial environment, Daw, 2012; 
Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012; 
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Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013). These models are acquired via 
prediction about future states of the world followed by adjustment from an error 
signal, just as in the “model-free” approaches of e.g., Ramscar et al. (2013). 
Model-based approaches are particularly promising because, when some of the 
basic parameters of the model can be specified in advance, then it is easy to 
learn an accurate representation of the world from relatively little data (Dayan & 
Daw, 2008; Doya, Samejima, Katagiri, & Kawato, 2002). Model-based learning 
has another advantage, in that possessing a model of the world allows the 
learner to rapidly change how they want to interact with it, based on only limited 
changes in information about the environment. By contrast, it is hard to 
immediately change the habits learned by a model-free approach (Dayan & Daw, 
2008). There is a clear analogy here between model-based learning and 
language development and processing: Children could use predictive learning to 
explore a space of possible grammars, and eventually determine the best-fitting 
model of the sentences that they have already heard. Innate restrictions on 
possible grammars would facilitate this learning. Possessing an explicit 
representation of the grammar (and of how other speakers tend to behave) would 
allow the learner to change its behaviour with limited incoming evidence (for 
evidence that adults behave in a way that is as flexible as this, see Nieuwland & 
Van Berkum, 2006). 
 
The role of dialogue in children’s predictions 
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We began this paper by talking about conversation, and about the important roles 
that prediction may play in explaining both how adults converse and how non-
linguistic children enter conversation for the first time. We have argued that, 
despite the importance of prediction for a number of different theories of 
language learning, and despite the strong evidence that prediction plays an 
important role in adult language processing, we currently lack grounds to 
conclude that prediction plays a role in acquisition – the evidence is suggestive, 
but not yet conclusive. However, this does not mean that prediction plays no role, 
and we have described potential empirical strategies for confirming the role of 
prediction in learning. 
 
In our discussion of prediction-based learning, we have therefore strayed far from 
our opening discussion of conversation. At least, we have focused on much 
smaller levels of analysis, such as words and sentences. Words and sentences 
are important: The major questions of language acquisition are focused on how 
children master meanings and syntactic structures.  But dialogues between 
speakers are probably the most natural form of language, and so are likely to 
play a vital role in how children learn about words and syntax in the first place. 
Moreover, dialogues are also the situations in which young children would most 
likely benefit from using prediction to produce rapid responses, as well as usually 
providing the conditions for such predictions to be more accurate (as dialogues 
are typically situated in a rich extra-linguistic context and tend to involve a lot of 
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repetition). It is therefore important to return to the question of how children 
master dialogue.  
 
Current theories of dialogue do not provide a natural explanation of how children 
learn to interrelate turn-taking and linguistic structure to create conversation. 
While there is a strong role for “expert” predictions in almost all theories, there 
has been little discussion of how that expert behaviour develops. Levinson’s 
(2006) Interaction Engine Hypothesis assumes that human children are born with 
the basic building blocks of conversation, so there is no need to explain their 
development. Pickering and Garrod’s (2004) Interactive Alignment model simply 
does not touch on the development of dialogue. One way to interpret the 
Interactive Alignment model is that dialogue is a consequence of mastering other 
types of linguistic representation, and not an independently learnt skill. In the 
model, levels of representation automatically prime one another across partners 
(one speaker’s syntactic representations align with her partner’s syntactic 
representations, her prosodic representations align with his prosodic 
representations, etc.), and also prime one another across levels of representation 
within a partner. That is to say, children’s ability to align at one level of 
representation will automatically allow them to begin aligning at other levels of 
representation. If these sorts of automatic priming mechanisms were present in 
young children, then it would help them to engage in adult-like dialogue while 
minimizing the need to learn additional mechanisms for conversation. There is 
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indeed evidence that children as young as 3 are sensitive to syntactic priming 
(Branigan, McLean, & Jones, 2005; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, & Shimpi, 2004; 
Rowland, Chang, Ambridge, Pine, & Lieven, 2012; Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008), 
although we do not know how these priming effects relate to children’s 
conversational abilities. 
 
The Interactive Alignment model suggests a very “bottom-up” model of how 
children learn language in its conversational context. In particular, the theory 
stands in contrast to other models (e.g., Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; 
Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 1999) in which children are assumed to use skills for 
reading high-level intentions to master the lower-level linguistic structures that 
define their language. This difference reflects a fundamental property of the 
Interactive Alignment model: Its mechanistic explanation of how interlocutors use 
low-level, perceivable cues to “read one another’s minds”. Developmentally, this 
suggests that children may initially learn to align at lower levels of representation, 
such as form (e.g., prosodic form or lexical form, Morgan & Demuth, 1995) before 
they learn to align at higher-level representations such as semantic or discourse 
structure. This fits with the evidence that even children as old as five years have 
difficulty using discourse and pragmatic information to interpret spoken 
sentences online (Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Huang & Snedeker, 2013; Snedeker 
& Trueswell, 2004).  
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These key properties of the Interaction Engine and Interactive Alignment models 
mean that while prediction can play a role in both, that role is subtly yet 
importantly different. Under the Interaction Engine hypothesis, children can 
automatically use (possibly innate) knowledge of social interaction, such as 
mental states and principles of conversational interaction, to inform their 
prediction-based learning of their language’s words and grammar. By contrast, 
under the Interactive Alignment model, children use prediction to not only 
discover the words and structures of their language, but also (presumably at the 
same time) to discover how those words and structures relate to factors such as 
mental states and principles of conversational interaction. 
 
These considerations suggest some changes to our initial story about the role of 
prediction. At the start of the paper, we noted that mechanisms of prediction were 
now being used to explain two distinct things: adults’ ability to rapidly converse, 
and children’s ability to learn language. The considerations above suggest that, 
in fact, these may not be so distinct after all. In particular, prediction, 
conversation, and learning may all interact, such that prediction and learning help 
to explain how, as adults, we engage in conversation, while conversation, in 
concert with prediction, helps to explain how children eventually learn. 
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